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DISPATCH NO. EGFA- 872

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 19 February 1953

FROM : Chief, FHB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OPERATIONAL/CALL

SPECIFIC— Contact Report, KIBITZ 15 Meeting 18 February.

REF: Para. 4, EGFA-850

1. Place, time and date of meeting—Hotel-Restaurant Haarlaas, Heidelberg; 1800, 18 February. Present: KIBITZ 15, [] and [] who was introduced as Mr. Keane.

2. After the usual financial accounting, subject made a cogent appeal for stepping up activities of his net. Was told we didn't want to discuss specifics at the present meeting, but the following criticisms applied to his net as presently constituted:

- a. Youth of members.
- b. Too many people knew too many other people.
- c. Too many people were in non-stayable occupations.
- d. Too many people would be on an automatic arrest list in case of an Eastern invasion.

Conclusion: If the net was to continue in any form, it could exist only for tactical purposes (for perhaps five weeks after an invasion). This in itself, however, is a worthy objective. To implement it, each person in the net would have to be scrutinized closely and appropriate changes made.

3. Subject agreed. Blamed KIBITZ 150—who has a tactical mind as opposed to his own strategic mind—for the present tactical nature of net. Said he envisaged a split in the net—part tactical and part strategic—and for the latter purpose had spotted individuals in stayable occupations who didn't know anyone.

4. Then told Subject we had been watching him closely over past two years and were convinced he was ready to take over much more important and difficult assignment. Was he interested? He was.

5. Told him we were interested in establishing a mechanism to provide for defection of Soviet officers in the Soviet Zone. We knew many officers desired

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to defect, but needed additional push, had to be shown way out, must be made to realize they would be well treated in West and would have the opportunity to work against the day of the present regime's downfall.

6. Subject's reaction was positive but commendably cautious. Said his knowledge and contacts in the Soviet Zone were old. Asked what "1-C" information was available. Was told there was little worthwhile. Said he would have to give matter a great deal of thought. We said we had expected that, and asked him to do a thorough staff study covering all aspects of problem. He agreed. He will notify [] through [] when staff study completed and second meeting will be held.

7. Cautioned Subject that if he engaged in this activity he would have to play all cards close to his vest. Operate as a lone wolf, with complete anonymity. Any exposure of his personal participation would likely result in his assassination. Since no one behind the Iron Curtain could be trusted, any person he wanted to use must be cleared. We must decide positively or negatively on all major questions of operation. He agreed.

8. Subject, as expected, then raised question of his status. Said he had been tentatively offered a job as Engineer General by Blank. We said a bird in the hand worth two in the bush. He then made a somewhat startling statement, said he had plenty of money from his business, he didn't care whether he was a big General in Bonn or a little man someplace else, as long as he was doing a worthwhile job. We said we had highly placed friends in Bonn, but a recommendation was not a guarantee; in any event status and recognition would stem from results, not agreement to an undertaking.

9. Then came back to subject of net. Told Subject it was obvious that KIBITZ 150, as a tactical man (see para. 3 above), should handle review and revision if that were the drill. His own good-will, however, would be needed.

10. Comment: Highly impressed by KIBITZ 15. He is intelligent, energetic, comparatively open-minded and well-motivated. He is not nearly so nationalistic as many members of the present Federal Government. Do not consider the question of his "status" difficult. On the control-factor his reactions are similar to most intelligent, positive individuals, either you run him or he runs you. It is questionable whether he will decide positively on engaging in a REDCAP operation, but if he does we probably will have the best operation in this field developed to date.